ABSTRACT The EU's identity construction as a normative power has often been described as a practice by which the EU portrays itself as a force for good while at the same time depicting other actors as inferior, thereby disempowering them rhetorically. In contrast to this, our findings indicate that in its relations to SSA, the EU intends to empower African countries by referring to them in a framework of solidarity and partnership. We trace this mechanism of empowering by analysing how the EU promoted the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Kyoto Protocol to African countries while at the same time trying to enable these countries to play an active role in the negotiations related to these institutions as well as in the institutions themselves. At the same time, though, this attempt to empower Africa displays crucial limits, concerning the effectiveness of the EU attempts to promoting norms and the international image of the EU itself. We argue that these limits might end up constraining the process of EU identity construction as a normative power.
'Europe has a strong interest in a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Africa. Our strategy is intended to help Africa achieve this.' (Council of the European Union 2005)

Introduction
Africa is often referred to as the 'forgotten continent' in which most international actors do not have a vested interest. Its Sub-Saharan part is the poorest and least developed area in the world.
1 Moreover, it is the world's most conflict-ridden region. Against this background, the EU's role in Africa is outstanding: the EU is the biggest export market for African products and the biggest donor of development aid. Partly, this stems from the traditionally strong bilateral links between individual EU member states and African countries due to their The EU's conduct of its foreign policy has been analysed as an attempt to construct its image as a normative power in international relations (Manners 2002) . The theoretical conceptualization and the empirical research on normative power Europe tended to emphasize -and criticize -the EU's missionary zeal and its propensity to 'inferiorize' outsiders in order to bolster its self-esteem (Diez 2005 ). Yet the EU engages in a rhetoric of partnership, solidarity and dialogue towards SSA (cf. Hilpold 2002) . Thus, EU-Africa relations are an excellent framework in which to investigate an aspect of the EU's normative power that did not receive much attention yet: the EU's efforts to empower others while endeavouring to promote its core values internationally.
The aim of our article is to investigate the EU's attempts at empowering SSA countries and provide an assessment of its limits. We will focus on two cases in which the EU attempts to advance its values internationally. First, the EU promotes the International Criminal Court (ICC) within the framework of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), thereby emphasizing its commitment to human rights. Secondly, the EU aims to disseminate the norm of environmental protection by supporting the Kyoto Protocol. We will provide empirical evidence that in both cases, the EU made efforts to empower SSA countries on three levels.
The identity level seems to be most crucial in that support for both international institutions on the part of African states may contribute to provide them with international recognition and legitimacy. Second, at the knowledge level, the EU supports SSA states by providing legal and technical expertise in order to enable them to participate in international negotiations and to implement international agreements. Finally, the EU provides material incentives (material level) within the framework of conditionality arrangements. However, whereas the first two levels are part of the EU's official self-portrayal, it tends to keep quiet about the provision of material incentives, since they seem to contradict its rhetoric of EU-Africa relations as a partnership on an equal footing. Moreover, although the EU is more committed than other actors, notably the US, in promoting ratification of international treaties by African governments, it appears only partially effective in this effort.
The reminder of this article is structured as follows: the next section is devoted to a critical discussion of the concept of normative power with a particular view to the modes of identity construction it involves. We will then move on to our case studies on the ICC (part 3) and on the Kyoto Protocol (part 4). In the fifth part, we will summarize our findings and discuss what insights the investigation of EU-Africa relations offers with respect to our understanding of the EU as a normative power.
Normative power EU: disempowering and empowering
The EU's normative power is understood as a practice by which the EU seeks to spread its core norms, such as human rights, democracy, rule of law and environmental protection, internationally. According to Ian Manners, the distinctive feature of the concept of normative power is that it refers to a specific form of power: '"power over opinion", idée force, or "ideological power" ' (2002: 239) . Normative power is thus defined as the 'ability to shape conceptions of "normal" in international relations' (ibid.). The concept of normative power shares some traits of the older notion of 'civilian power ' (cf. Maull 1990; Hill 1990; Duchêne 1973) in that it indicates a predisposition for the use of non-military instruments in foreign policy, a preference for non-coercive means -'carrots' rather than 'sticks' -and a firm 4 commitment to multilateralism (cf. Sjursen 2006b: 172 (Manners 2006a) . Moreover, the EU's role as a normative power is related to its distinctive nature as a political organization.
The EU is not a state. Rather, it is a post-Westphalian entity and as such, it is also characterized by distinctive decision-making processes (Manners 2002: 240f.) .
The practice of 'othering' has received much attention as an activity by which EU officials construct the EU's identity as a normative power while at the same time exerting power in its external relations. 'Othering' refers to the demarcation of the self against a -threatening, inferior or simply different -other (Diez 2005: 628; Rumelili 2004) . Thus, othering is a practice by which the EU constructs its identity, but it is also a transformative action with very 'real' consequences. Securitization, i.e. the continued depiction of an 'other' as threatening to the own political community, may result in military action (Waever 1995) . The EU's policy towards Turkey is underpinned by the notion that Turkey represents the EU's 'other' inasmuch as its human rights record does not live up to the standards and requirements set out in the Copenhagen criteria (Diez 2005 (Diez : 632, 2004 . The EU's behaviour on the matter of the Kyoto protocol and the ICC in transatlantic relations is guided by the idea that the US is lagging behind in the implementation of universal values of human rights and environmental protection (Scheipers and Sicurelli 2007) . Finally, as Manners (2005: 15) remarks, the EU's 'other' does not necessarily have to be a political entity outside the EU. EU officials frequently depict the EU's 'self' as its 'other' as a way of criticizing aspects or situations within the EU itself as not living up to the EU's intrinsic aspirations.
In all the examples quoted above, othering has a strong connotation of disempowering the other while at the same time empowering the self -the EU -inasmuch as the other is depicted as inferior. 4 This, however, is only one form in which othering can occur. The aim of our article is to investigate a different practice in the context of the EU's role as and its exertion of normative power; namely, the extent to which the EU empowers other actors. The concept of 3
The debate about normative power encompasses different views on how normative power and civilian power are related. Manners stresses that normative power is different from civilian power, because the latter neglects the importance of ideas and norms (2006b: 175ff., 2002: 240) . Diez argues that 'civilian power can be read as one specific form of normative power in that at its heart lie particular kinds of norms (namely civilian) ' (2005: 617) , whereas Sjursen uses the terms normative power and civilian power almost interchangeably (2006a,b). 4 In the case of the 'self' as 'other', this is a process of devaluing certain EU identity construction and promoting others instead. It should be noted, however, that discourses of othering have a dynamic of their own and can therefore also result in empowering rather than disempowering the other. If Turkey improves its human record, for instances, it can in turn demand to be granted access to the EU (cf. Diez 2005: 633) .
5
empowering has a strong link with social relations of constitution. It is related to the idea of 'power to' rather than 'power over':
'Concepts of power rooted in behaviour and interaction point to actors' exercise of control over others; they are, then, "power over" concepts. Concepts of power tied to social relations of constitution, in contrast, consider how social relations define who the actors are and what capacities and practices they are socially empowered to undertake; these concepts are, then, focused on the social production of actors' "power to".' (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 46) .
As with othering in general, empowering is identity-based, but in contrast to disempowering the 'other', it aims at increasing the recognition and the international status of a third country or actor by, for instance, depicting it as equal or even similar to the 'self'. During the drafting stage, the major problem of African states was their lack of expertise and resources. They often were not able to send delegations to the pre-Rome negotiations, or, if they did so, they had only very small delegations that could not cover all working groups that convened simultaneously (Pace 1999: 193) . Moreover, they were rarely able to prepare detailed positions on contested issues before the negotiations (Deitelhoff 2004: 13) .
Therefore, some NGOs seconded experts to a number of African delegations (Glasius 2002: 7 151) . Apart from the lack of expertise, there was also the problem of the general suspicion against the ICC as a 'western court for Africa' on the part of a number of African countries (Tine 1998: 11) .
In Rome itself, however, a majority of SSA states came to support LMG positions. The most important aspect was that the LMG proposed an independent Court to which all states and their citizens would submit equally, i.e. they envisaged an institutional design for the ICC that was based on reciprocity. From the perspective of SSA countries, this proposal seemed to allay the concern that the ICC would evolve as a 'Western' court for Africa ( 
The drafting stage
The EU contributed to shaping the positions of the group of Sub-Saharan countries in the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol.
The EU proposed a 'differentiation mechanism' based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. According to this mechanism, developing countries should not be required to cut their emissions, since limitations of industrial production would undermine their economic development. At the same time, the EU suggested that the Protocol set the basis for the voluntary use of alternative means of production in developing countries that are not considered harmful to the climate. The idea behind the differentiation mechanism is that it is the only way to have developing countries on board in the attempt to solve the problem of global warming 9 . The US, on the contrary, was in favor of a uniform universal commitment.
The US fears that the differentiation mechanism, by contributing to the empowerment of raising economies such as China and India, would affect its relative economic power. The 8
The ICC currently investigates the situation in Darfur, Somalia, but this is due to a referral of the UN Security Council and is contrary to the preference of the government in Khartoum.
9
The EU's normative committment to environmental protection and development cooperation does not exclude interests as a guiding force of EU foreign environmental policy. As Falkner (2007: 521) suggests, the role of the EU in the climate change negotiations may be 'closely connected with the political economy of energy production, manufacturing and consumption in Europe'.
differentiation mechanism was ultimately included in the Protocol, providing the US with a major argument for opposing ratification.
The group representing developing countries in the Kyoto negotiations gave full support to the EU proposal, since these countries considered it coherent with their development interest.
As Group'-was composed of developing countries. This group was clearly closer to the EU's position than to the that of the US, being in favor of a reduced use of flexibility mechanisms.
(Torvarger 1998).
The ratification and implementation stage
While the EU did succeed in influencing the positions of Sub-Saharan countries in the Kyoto negotiations, the attempt to push these countries to ratify and implement the Protocol had mixed results.
After having ratified the Kyoto Protocol, the EU tried to persuade other parties to do the These meetings show that climate change has become an increasingly relevant issue for SSA countries and that the EU considers the ACP and the AU as interlocutors in drafting postKyoto commitments.
EU normative power through empowering
The relationship between the EU and SSA provides an arena for the process of EU identity building. The EU's self-representation as the force for good is an expression of its attempt to construct its image as a normative power. In order to promote its norms internationally, the EU tries to build an image of itself as an altruistic actor. In contrast to existing research which stresses the EU's propensity to disempower others while constructing its identity as a force for good, the case of EU-Africa relations is intriguing inasmuch as the EU refers to the African continent through a solidarity-based rhetoric, thereby aiming to empower SSA countries.
The process of national identity building in some of the EU member states -notably Germany and Italy -had largely anticipated the process of state building. In these states, national identity was built on the assertion of the existence of a pre-political community based on linguistic and ethnic ground. The process of EU identity construction evolves in the opposite direction (Fabbrini 2007) . The process of EU polity building started 50 years ago, but the construction of the EU identity is far from being accomplished. While nation states tend to construct their identity on the basis of shared perceptions of common belonging, the EU has to find alternative means to build its identity. Foreign policy provides the EU with a ground to fill this identity-gap. Besides 'self representation', the process of identity building through Material level: In the Kyoto case, the EU made the provision of parts of its development aid conditional on the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. In the ICC case, the EU partly compensates African countries refusing to sign a BIA with the US for lost aid.
Curiously, whilst the first two levels of empowering are part of the EU's self-depiction, the level of material rewards or, rather, compensations is excluded from the EU's public selfportrayal in the case of the ICC. Although EU officials saw the pragmatic need for compensation measures, the latter were not made public. Thus, in the construction of its external relations, the EU emphasizes non-material measures and at times keeps quiet about the material ones. This self-portrayal is in line with the 'emphasis on the normative power of non-material exemplification found in the contagion of norms through imitation and attraction' (Manners 2006b: 176) . It indicates, however, that the EU is at times merely 'miming' normative power, since self-portrayal and actions differ. It is also a sign of a specific paradox of the mechanism of empowering: whilst empowering aims at treating the other on an equal footing, it actually emerges from a relationship of inequality. The 'empowerer' has both the initiative and superior (symbolic and material) resources -without the latter, empowering would not work. In order for it to work, however, this inequality has to be concealed as far as possible. that, although they consider the EU as a privileged partner, they recognize limits in the effectiveness -and sincere altruism -of its empowering mission. These criticisms recall the concern of several scholars about the self-interests of the EU with respect to other issues of its involvement in Africa, such as trade and security. Faust and Messner (2005) , Manners (2006) and Storey (2006) suggest that the interests moving EU intervention in Africa may undermine its commitment to development cooperation. In the case of the ICC and the Kyoto Protocol, the clash between the interest of the EU in promoting international law and the development interests of SSA countries is not that evident. Nevertheless, if the fears of SSA representatives for a new European colonialism prevail over the image of the EU as a political partner, the effort of the EU to appear as the champion of solidarity towards developing countries might be hindered. The limits of the EU normative impact may affect its relationship with third countries in the long run and, ultimately, undermine its international identity as a normative power.
Conclusion
The relationship between the EU and SSA in the fields of human rights and environmental protection provides evidence that the EU is constructing (or is trying to construct) its identity as a normative power.
In its attempt to persuade SSA states to ratify the ICC Statute and the Kyoto Protocol the EU shows its commitment to diffusing the norms of human rights and environmental protection beyond its borders. The policy instruments the EU has selected to this purpose are consistent with the model of a normative power. The EU has provided Sub-Saharan countries with identity, expertise and financial resources to take part in international negotiations. Moreover, the EU has tried to empower African states through proposing the principle of reciprocity in the ICC negotiations and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities in the fight against climate change. These instruments, aimed at improving the international position of these countries, have -at least partially -helped the EU to build its image of solidaritybased normative power.
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